A good resource to understand the different tactics and techniques used by adversaries is MITRE ATT&CK. A lot of these techniques are mapped and implemented through the sigma project from Florian Roth, which can be deployed in several SIEM vendors. However, a key requirement to implement these rules is to have proper end-point monitoring on account that most of the techniques from ATT&CK are base on end-point detection. In Windows environments, this includes events from Sysmon, Windows security logs and PowerShell logs.
Monitoring PowerShell is nowadays a must as many adversaries are using PowerShell, and frameworks using PowerShell like Empire, PowerSploit, Cobalt Strike, etc, as part of their tool arsenal. A few weeks back, during Botconf 2018, Tom Ueltschi did a presentation with the title "Hunting and detecting APTs using Sysmon and PowerShell logging". During his presentation Tom focused on detecting the ATT&CK techniques T1084 (Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription), T1037 (Logon Scripts) and T1086 (PowerShell) and he explained the approach he followed to detect APT attacks which use PowerShell at some point.
Going back to Gozi, the idea is to use some of the unique TTPs to cluster different campaigns and associate them to unique groups. For that, I focus the analysis on some key aspects:
- Delivery Mechanism: Email is the main distribution mean, however there are differences between campaigns. For example, in some campaigns stolen email credentials are used. In some other other fake invoices are used as attachment, etc.
- Attachment / Link: In some cases, the attached file is a VBS script. Other times, it is weaponised Microsoft Word Documents. Eventually, there is not attachment but malicious link.
- Utilities: Built-in tools from the OS that are being used. For example, PowerShell, cmd.exe, certutil.exe, BITS, etc.
- Full Command: Unique set of commands being use to pull the malware. This combines the utilities but sometimes using some unique 'patterns'.
- Binary signed: whether the dropped binary is signed or not.
- Gozi Version: version 2 or 3.
(This is just an example of some of the key indicators that can be used to cluster difference campaigns)
Analysis of the VBS, Gozi version, PowerShell commands..
For the analysis of the different campaigns I combined some dynamic analysis techniques with sandboxes, similar to what I did here, and some debugging. For example, for the VBS scripts and in order to extract the set of commands without fully detonating the malware I use x32dbg with a breakpoint on Shell32.ShellExecuteExW.
By the way, with proper PowerShell logging the transcript of the logs provides the full set of commands executed:
The analysis of the Gozi Binary version is done with some Yara rules running in memory.
Putting all together, I am able to create some matrix where I can identify the overlap between campaigns, which potentially link to unique actors: